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Abstract
We present a fuzzy version of the Group Identification Problem
(“Who is a J?”) introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997). We
consider a class N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, each one with an opinion
about the membership to a group J of the members of the society,
consisting in a function pi : N → [0, 1], indicating for each agent,
including herself, the degree of membership to J .
We consider the problem of aggregating those functions, satisfying
different sets of axioms and characterizating different aggregators.
While some results are analogous to those of the originally crisp model,
the fuzzy version is able to overcome some of the main impossibility
results of Kasher and Rubinstein.
1 Introduction
People usually classifies other people, objects or entities in groups. Some-
times these classifications are obvious, as in the assignment of countries to
the continent to which they belong. But in many cases, opinions may not be
even clear cut and thus it becomes hard to reach a consensus. For instance,
if a group of people wants to identify which of them should be considered
“tall”, finding out whether a member is such may be far from evident. Of
course, a consensus could be reached on that people that are 2.00 meters
height or more are “tall”. But it is not clear whether someone who’s height
is 1.75 meters can be considered “tall”.
This kind of classification problems, prone to vagueness and imprecision,
gave the impetus for the introduction of fuzzy sets. Zadeh (1965) defined a
fuzzy subset U of a set A as a membership function f : A → [0, 1], where
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f(a) indicates the degree of membership of a in U . This allows to represent,
in particular, preferences as degrees. In turn, there are several approaches
to the aggregation of fuzzy preferences. Just to mention older contributions,
(Dutta et al., 1987) deal with exact choices under vague preferences while
(Dutta, 1986) investigates the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules determin-
ing fuzzy social orderings.
In this paper we introduce a fuzzy approach to the group identification prob-
lem formalized by Kasher and Rubinstein (K-R) in “Who is a J?”(1997).
They consider a finite society that has to determine which of its subsets of
members consists of exactly those individuals that can be deemed to be Js.
By a slight abuse of language, this subset is denoted J . Each different set
of axioms postulated to yield a solution to this problem characterizes a class
of aggregation functions, called Collective Identity Functions (CIFs) . The
“Liberal” one labels as a J any individual that deems himself to be a J ; the
“Dictatorial” CIF is such that a single individual decides who is a J . Finally,
the “Oligarchic” CIF determines that somebody is a J if all the members of
a given group agree on that.
Since K-R, the group identification problem in a crisp setting has been ap-
proached in many ways. Sung and Dimitrov (2005), refine the characteri-
zation of the liberal CIF, Miller (2008) study the problem of defining more
than two groups, Saporiti and Cho (2017) analyze the incentives of voters in
an incomplete preferences setting, etc.
In our model, every agent, instead of labeling any of the individuals in
N = {1, . . . , n} (the society) as belonging or not to J , assigns a value in
the [0, 1] interval to each agent, representing the degree in which that agent
is believed to belong to J . The axioms in K-R have counterparts in our frame-
work. On the other hand, we also consider another axiom drawn from the
literature, namely the Extreme Liberalism axiom (Fioravanti-Tohme´, 2018).
We present fuzzy versions of those crisp axioms. We deal first with the ax-
ioms defining the “Liberal” aggregator, showing that the fuzzy versions of
the results in K-R remain valid. But when we turn to the axioms defining
the Dictatorial aggregator, our results differ from those in the crisp setting.
More specifically, K-R prove an impossibility result when the domain and
the range of the aggregator are restricted, indicating that the Dictatorial
CIF is the only one satisfying those conditions. But there does not exist a
clear “translation” of those restrictions into our framework, allowing different
interpretations. In some of these we obtain more aggregators verifying the
axioms, while in others there does not exist any of them.
Fuzzy settings of this problem have been studied several times in the last
years. So, for instance, Cho and Park (2018) present a model of group
identification for more than two groups, allowing fractional opinions, while
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Ballester and Garc´ıa-Lapresta (2008) deal with fuzzy opinions in a sequential
model. An interesting paper related to ours, is Alcantud and Andre´s Calle
(A-AC, 2017), which presents a deep analysis of the aggregation problem
of fuzzy opinions yielding fuzzy subsets. This contribution introduces the
Fuzzy Collective Identity Functions (FCIFs), an expression that we adopt
in this paper, defining the liberal and dictatorial aggregators, among others,
presenting ways of circumventing the classical impossibility result from K-R.
The main difference between this and our work is that we find a characteriza-
tion of the liberal FCIF, and determine different domain and range conditions
according to which the impossibility result can obtain or be eluded.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to present the model
and the set of axioms considered here. In Section 3 we deal with “Liberal” ag-
gregators while in Section 4 we focus on the Dictatorial aggregator. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and axioms
Let N = {1, . . . n} be a set of agents that have to define who of them belongs
to the group of Js (which by a slight abuse of language is denoted J). The
opinion of agent i is characterized by a function pi : N → [0, 1] where pi(j)
indicates the assessment of agent i of the degree of membership of j to J .
Agent i has thus a vector of opinions Pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(n)}. A profile of
opinions P is a n × n matrix P = {P1, . . . , Pn}. With P we denote the set
of all the profiles of opinions.
A fuzzy subset J of N is characterized by a membership (characteristic) func-
tion fJ : N → [0, 1], that indicates the degree of membership of an agent to
J . Let F = {fJ : N → [0, 1]} be the set of possible membership functions of
a fuzzy subset J . We denote by FJ the Fuzzy Collective Identity Function
(FCIF) such that FJ : P→ F.
A FCIF takes a profile of opinions and returns a membership function for
the fuzzy subset J . More precisely, the membership function of the set J
associated to the profile P ∈ P is denoted fPJ . We do not impose further
restrictions on this membership function. It can be different for every i, for
example, fPJ (1) = p1(1) while f
P
J (2) =
p2(2)
2
.
In what follows we will present in an axiomatic way the properties that a
social planner would like to see implemented by a “fair” aggregation pro-
cess, several of them introduced already by K-R in their seminal work. The
following two axioms state that, if the opinion about an agent changes, say
by increasing (decreasing) his degree of membership, then the aggregated
opinion should reach at least (at most) the previous degree.
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• Fuzzy Monotonicity (FMON): let P ∈ P be such that fPJ (i) = a
and let P ′ be a profile such that P ′k,i > Pk,i for some k with P
′
h,j = Ph,j
for all (h, j) 6= (k, i), then fP
′
J (i) ≥ a.
If P ′′ is a profile such that P ′′k,i < Pk,i for some k with P
′′
h,j = Ph,j for
all (h, j) 6= (k, i), then fP
′′
J (i) ≤ a.
• Fuzzy Strong Monotonicity (FSMON): let P ∈ P be such that
fPJ (i) = a and let P
′ be a profile such that P ′k,i > Pk,i for some k with
P ′h,j = Ph,j for all (h, j) 6= (k, i),then f
P ′
J (i) > a.
If P ′′ is a profile such that P ′′k,i < Pk,i for some k with P
′′
h,j = Ph,j for
all (h, j) 6= (k, i), then fP
′′
J (i) < a.
It is easy to see that if a FCIF verifies FSMON then it satisfies FMON.
The next axiom states that the aggregate opinion about an agent is bounded
by the upper and lower bounds of all the individual opinions about that
agent. That is:
• Fuzzy Consensus (FC): if pi(j) ≥ aj and pi(j) ≤ bj for some aj, bj ∈
R, aj , bj > 0 and for all i ∈ N , then aj ≤ f
P
J (j) ≤ bj .
1
The following axiom states that if two agents are evaluated in a similar way,
the FCIF must classify them also similarly:
• Symmetry (SYM): agents j and k are symmetric if:
– pi(j) = pi(k) for all i ∈ N − {j, k}
– pj(i) = pk(i) for all i ∈ N − {j, k}
– pj(k) = pk(j)
– pj(j) = pk(k)
Then, if two agents j and k are symmetric it follows that fPJ (j) =
fPJ (k).
The following property is our first true “fuzzy” axiom. It distinguishes be-
tween being more approved than disapproved: an agent that gets a mem-
bership degree of more than 0.5 can be consider to have been approved to
belong to the group of Js.2
1Alcantud and Andre´s Calle (2017) call this property Unanimity.
2We could have taken any number in [0, 1] as threshold, instead of 0.5. The main results
in this paper do not depend on this particular choice.
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• Fuzzy Symmetry (FSYM): agents j and k are fuzzy-symmetric if:
– pi(j), pi(k) ≥ 0.5 or pi(j), pi(k) < 0.5 for all i ∈ N − {j, k}
– pj(i), pk(i) ≥ 0.5 or pj(i), pk(i) < 0.5 for all i ∈ N − {j, k}
– pj(k), pk(j) ≥ 0.5 or pj(k), pk(j) < 0.5
– pj(j), pk(k) ≥ 0.5 or pj(j), pk(k) < 0.5
If two agents j and k are fuzzy-symmetric then fPJ (j), f
P
J (k) ≥ 0.5 or
fPJ (j), f
P
J (k) < 0.5.
While SYM means that fPJ (j) = f
P
J (k) for all j, k ∈ N , FSYM does not
impose such a strong condition. The following examples may be useful to
understand the difference.
Example 1. Consider N = {1, 2}.
• The FCIF such that fJ(i) =
p1(i)+p2(i)
2
satisfies SYM but not FSYM.
To see this, consider profile P = ({0.1, 0.9}, {0.6, 0.4}). We have that
fPJ (1) = 0.35 < 0.5 and f
P
J (2) = 0.65 > 0.5.
• The FCIF such that fJ(1) = 0.2p1(1)+0.2p2(1) and fJ(2) = 0.1p1(2) + 0.1p2(2)
verifies FSYM but not SYM.
The next axiom states that the aggregate opinion about an agent should
only take into account the individual opinions about her.
The other is its “fuzzy” version.
• Independence (I): let P and P ′ be two profiles such that given an
agent j ∈ N , pi(j) = p
′
i(j) for all i ∈ N . Then f
P
J (j) = f
P ′
J (j).
• Fuzzy Independence (FI): let P and P ′ be two profiles such that
given an agent j ∈ N and for every i ∈ N we have pi(j) ≥ 0.5 iff
p′i(j) ≥ 0.5 and pi(j) < 0.5 iff p
′
i(j) < 0.5.
Then fPJ (j) ≥ 0.5 iff f
P ′
J (j) ≥ 0.5.
The difference between the last two axioms is that while Independence means
that fJ(i) = f(p1(i), . . . , pn(i)), FI allows every agent to be affected by the
opinion about the other agents.
The next two examples provide a more clear view of how this axioms affect
the FCIF.
Example 2. Consider N = {1, 2}.
5
• The FCIF such that fJ(i) =
p1(i)+p2(i)
2
verifies I but not FI as it can be
seen in profiles P = ({0.1, 0.6}, {0.6, 0.7}) and P ′ = ({0.45, 0.6}, {0.95, 0.7}).
We have that fPJ (1) = 0.35 < 0.5 and f
P ′
J (1) = 0.7 > 0.5.
• The FCIF such that fJ(1) = 0.25p1(1)+0.25p1(2) and fJ(2) = 0.25p2(1)+0.25p2(2)
verifies FI but not I.
The following axiom states that the opinion that an agent has about
himself should be considered important to determine if she is considered a J .
• Liberalism (L): if pi(i) = 1 for some i ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) = 1 for some
k ∈ N .
If pi(i) = 0 for some i ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) = 0 for some k ∈ N .
A fuzzy version of this axiom is:
• Fuzzy Liberalism (FL): if pi(i) ≥ 0.5 for some i ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) ≥
0.5 for some k ∈ N .
If pi(i) < 0.5 for some i ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) < 0.5 for some k ∈ N .
The following example shows the difference between these two axioms:
Example 3. Consider N = {1, . . . , n}.
• The FCIF such that fJ(i) = 1 if pi(i) = 1 and fJ(i) = 0 otherwise,
verifies L but not FL.
• The FCIF such that fJ(i) = 0.9 if pi(i) ≥ 0.5 and fJ(i) = 0.1 if
pi(i) < 0.5, verifies FL but not L.
Other relevant properties concern the capacity any agent has of being
determinant on the characterization as J of another one (like a parent about
the religious affiliation of his kids):
• Extreme Liberalism (EL):
(i) If pi(j) = 1 for some i, j ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) = 1 for some k ∈ N .
(ii) If pi(j) = 0 for some i, j ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) = 0 for some k ∈ N .
A fuzzy version is:
• Fuzzy Extreme Liberalism (FEL):
(i) If pi(j) ≥ 0.5 for some i, j ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) ≥ 0.5 for some k ∈ N .
(ii) If pi(j) < 0.5 for some i, j ∈ N , then f
P
J (k) < 0.5 for some k ∈ N .
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Some final examples illustrate the difference between these last two ax-
ioms.
Example 4. Consider N = {1, . . . , n}.
• A FCIF that satisfies EL but not FEL: fJ such that fJ(i) = 1 for all
i ∈ N −{1} and fJ(1) = 0 if there exist a j, k ∈ N such that pj(k) = 0
or fJ(1) = 1 otherwise.
• A FCIF that verifies FEL but not EL: consider N = {1, 2} and fJ such
that fJ (1) = 0.9 and fJ(2) = 0.1 for every P ∈ P.
3 Liberalism
We define the Strong Liberal FCIF as:
L(P1, . . . , PN)(i) = LJ (i) = pi(i)
for all i ∈ N .
It is straightforward to see that this FCIF is analogous to the Strong Liberal
CIF that K-R introduced in their work. It verifies FMON, FC, FI and FL.
Moreover, it is the only FCIF that verifies this set of axioms:
Theorem 1. The only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and FL is the
Strong Liberal FCIF.
Proof. It is clear that the Liberal FCIF verifies these 4 axioms. Suppose
there exists another FCIF satisfying them. Let P be a profile such that
pi(i) ≥ 0.5 but f
P
J (i) < 0.5. Using FMON several times we can create a
profile P ′ identical to P except that p′j(i) < 0.5 for all j 6= i, such that
fP
′
J (i) < 0.5. Consider a profile P
′′ such that p′′i (i) ≥ 0.5 and p
′′
j (k) < 0.5 for
all j, k ∈ N (except when j = k = i). By FC we have that fP
′′
J (k) < 0.5 for
all k 6= i. So the set of agents such that fP
′′
J (k) ≥ 0.5 belongs to {∅, {i}}.
Because of FL we have fP
′′
J (i) ≥ 0.5. But then we have a contradiction with
FI, because agent i is treated similarly (in the sense of FI) in profiles P ′ and
P ′′ but fP
′
J (i) < 0.5 and f
P ′′
J (i) ≥ 0.5.
This result is still valid even if we use a mixture of fuzzy and crisp axioms:
Corollary 1. The only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, I and L is the Strong
Liberal FCIF.
From the uniqueness of the Strong Liberal FCIF we obtain the following
result:
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Corollary 2. If a FCIF verifies FMON, FC, FI and FL then it verifies SYM
and FSYM.
From the fact that the Liberal FCIF does not verify FSMON and that
FSMON implies FMON we get:
Corollary 3. There is no FCIF that verifies FSMON, FC, FI and FL.
The following two FCIFs are the fuzzy counterparts of the Unanimity and
Inclusive CIF:
• The Unanimity FCIF is defined as:
U (P1, . . . , PN)(i) = UJ(i) = minjpj(i)
for all i ∈ N .3
• The Inclusive FCIF is defined as:
Inc(P1, . . . , PN)(i) = IncJ(i) = max jpj(i)
for all i ∈ N .4
As in the crisp case, under extreme concepts of liberalism like EL or FEL,
we obtain the same uniqueness results:
Theorem 2. Inc is the only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and EL (i)
or FEL (i).
U is the only FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and EL(ii) or FEL(ii).
Proof. A similar construction as the used for proving Theorem 1 yields the
proof of the two statements.
We can derive the following impossibility result from Theorem 2:
Corollary 4. There is no FCIF that verifies FMON, FC, FI and FEL or
EL.
3Alcantud and Andre´s Calle (2017) define this aggregator as the Conjunctive FCIF.
4Alcantud and Andre´s Calle (2017) call this aggregator the Benevolent FCIF.
8
4 Dictatorship
Kasher and Rubinstein use, in a section of their paper, a slightly modified
version of the CIFs. They assume that there is a consensus in the society
that there exists someone who is a J and someone who is not a J .
Then, it follows that the only CIF (with the alternative domain and range
conditions established for this case) that verifies Consensus and Independence
is the Dictatorial one.
Here we define the Dictatorial FCIF with the agent j as a dictator as:
D(P1, . . . , PN)(i) = DJ(i) = pj(i)
for all i ∈ N .
There are many ways to interpret these restrictions in our framework. One
possibility is that in a profile Pi, there exists at least one j such that pi(j) = 1
and one k such that pi(k) = 0. We call this set of profiles P
∗.
An alternative set of profiles is P∗∗, in which for every agent i there exists
at least one k and one j such that pi(k) ≥ 0.5 and pi(j) ≤ 0.5.
Another possible case is that in which pi 6= 1 and pi 6= 0. We call this set
P∗∗∗.
With respect to the membership functions, we can consider the case in which
there exist at least one j and one k such that fJ(j) = 1 and fJ(k) = 0. The
class of such function is denoted F∗.
We define F∗∗ as the set of membership functions such that for every profile P
there exists at least one k and one j such that fPJ (k) ≥ 0.5 and f
P
J (k) ≤ 0.5.
Finally we have the family of functions such that fJ 6= 1 and fJ 6= 0. We
call this set F∗∗∗.
It is easy to verify that:
P∗ ⊂ P∗∗ ⊂ P∗∗∗
and
F∗ ⊂ F∗∗ ⊂ F∗∗∗
A social planner may require different properties to be satisfied by the do-
mains and ranges of membership functions. Depending on those specifica-
tions, there are various possibilities:
Theorem 3. Consider FCIFs that satisfy axioms FC and FI.
1. Dictatorial is not the only FCIF such that FJ : P∗∗∗ → F∗∗∗.
2. Dictatorial is the only FCIF such that FJ : P∗ → F∗∗ or FJ : P∗∗ →
F
∗∗, and there is no FCIF such that FJ : P∗∗∗ → F∗∗.
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3. Dictatorial is the only FCIF such that FJ : P∗ → F∗, and there is no
FCIF such that FJ : P∗∗ → F∗ or FJ : P∗∗∗ → F∗.
Proof. 1. We represent with |P i|> the number of pj(i)s that are larger
than 0.5 and with |P i|< the number of those less than 0.5 in a profile
P ∈ P.
Now we consider the following FCIF:
fPJ (i) =


minjpj(i)+maxjpj(i)
2
if |P i|> = n
0.5+maxjpj(i)
2
if |P i|> > |P i|<
pj(i) if pj(i) = pk(i) for all j, k ∈ N
0.5 if |P i|< = |P i|>
0.5+minjpj(i)
2
if |P i|< > |P i|>
minjpj(i)+maxjpj(i)
2
if |P i|< = n
This FCIF verifies FC and FI and is not the Dictatorial FCIF.
2. We denote with |fPJ |
> the number of fPJ (i)s larger or equal to 0.5 while
|fPJ |
< are those less than 0.5 in the membership function f ∈ F.
We say that a coalition L ⊆ N is fuzzy semidecisive for agent i, if the
following conditions are satisfied for every profile P ∈ P:
[for all j ∈ L, pj(i) ≥ 0.5 and for all j /∈ L, pj(i) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
j (i) ≥ 0.5
(1)
and
[for all j ∈ L, pj(i) < 0.5 and for all j /∈ L, pj(i) > 0.5]⇒ f
P
j (i) < 0.5.
(2)
A coalition L ⊆ N is called fuzzy semidecisive if it is fuzzy semidecisive
for every agent i in N .
Analogously, we say that L ⊆ N is fuzzy decisive over agent i if the
following conditions are satisfied for every profile P ∈ P:
[for all j ∈ L, pj(i) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
j (i) ≥ 0.5
and
[for all j ∈ L, pj(i) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
j (i) < 0.5.
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In the same way, L ⊆ N is said fuzzy decisive if it is fuzzy decisive for
every agent i in N .
We will first prove the existence of a semidecisive coalition for an agent
i, and then show that is semidecisive for all i ∈ N . Without loss of
generality we start assuming that N = 3 (the result extends easily to
all other cases).
Consider, also w.l.g. the profile
P 1 = ({0.1, 0.6, 0.1}, {0.9, 0.2, 0.3}, {0.1, 0.2, 0.8}).
By hypothesis, |fP
1
J |
> 6= 3 and |fP
1
J |
< 6= 3.
Suppose |fP
1
J |
> = 2, and that fP
1
J (1), f
P 1
J (2) ≥ 0.5. Now consider the
profile
P 2 = ({0.1, 0.6, 0.6}, {0.9, 0.2, 0.5}, {0.1, 0.2, 0.8}).
By FI, fP
2
J (1), f
P 2
J (2) ≥ 0.5 and by FC f
P 2
J (3) ≥ 0.5, a contradiction.
Then |fP
1
J |
> = 1.
Suppose now that fP
2
J (2) ≥ 0.5. By FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(2) ≥ 0.5, p2(2) < 0.5, p3(2) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (2) ≥ 0.5.
(3)
It follows that (1) is verified by L = {1} for i = 2.
Consider now profile
P 3 = ({0.6, 0.1, 0.2}, {0.1, 0.7, 0.1}, {0.1, 0.8, 0.4})
and suppose by contradiction that fP
3
J (2) ≥ 0.5.
By FC, fP
3
J (3) < 0.5. Moreover, f
P 3
J (1) < 0.5.
Otherwise, if fP
3
J (1) ≥ 0.5, the profile
P 4 = ({0.6, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.1, 0.7, 0.9}, {0.1, 0.8, 0.9})
would lead to a contradiction, because by FI, fP
4
J (1), f
P 4
J (2) ≥ 0.5; and
by FC, fP
4
J (3) > 0.5.
Thus, the only possibility is that fP
4
J (2) > 0.5 and by FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(2) < 0.5, p2(2) > 0.5, p3(2) > 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (2) > 0.5.
Consider the following profile
P 5 = ({0.2, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.6, 0.2, 0.1}, {0.6, 0.1, 0.3}).
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By FC fP
5
J (2) < 0.5.
If fP
5
J (3) ≥ 0.5, then the profile
P 6 = ({0.6, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.6, 0.8, 0.1}, {0.6, 0.8, 0.3})
yields |fP
6
J |
> = 3, a contradiction.
Then, the only possibility is that fP
5
J (1) ≥ 0.5 and by FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(1) < 0.5, p2(1) ≥ 0.5, p3(1) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (1) ≥ 0.5.
(4)
Finally, consider
P 7 = ({0.1, 0.6, 0.7}, {0.6, 0.3, 0.9}, {0.6, 0.1, 0.7}).
By (3) and (4) we have that fP
7
J (1), f
P 7
J (2) ≥ 0.5 and by FC f
P 7
J (3) ≥
0.5, a contradiction.
Thus (2) is verified for agent 1, that is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 2.
Now, we can prove that if there exists a fuzzy decisive coalition L ⊆ N
for some i ∈ N , then L is fuzzy semidecisive. Without loss of generality,
we can suppose that L = {1} is fuzzy decisive for 2.
Let
P 8 = ({0.4, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.6, 0.2, 0.1}, {0.6, 0.3, 0.3}).
By FC fP
8
J (2) < 0.5.
Moreover, if only fP
8
J (1) ≥ 0.5, then by FI, FC and the fact that agent
1 is fuzzy decisive over 2, we have that |fP
9
J |
> = 3 with
P 9 = ({0.4, 0.6, 0.7}, {0.6, 0.2, 0.9}, {0.6, 0.3, 0.8}),
a contradiction.
Then fP
8
J (3) ≥ 0.5 and by FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) ≥ 0.5, p2(3) < 0.5, p3(3) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
Consider the profile
P 10 = ({0.6, 0.1, 0.3}, {0.2, 0.2, 0.7}, {0.2, 0.3, 0.9}).
If fP
10
J (3) ≥ 0.5, then by FI, FC and the fact that agent 1 is fuzzy
decisive over 2, we have that |fP
11
J |
> = 3 with
P 11 = ({0.7, 0.6, 0.1}, {0.6, 0.2, 0.9}, {0.6, 0.3, 0.8}),
a contradiction.
Thus fP
10
J (3) < 0.5 and by FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) < 0.5, p2(3) ≥ 0.5, p3(3) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) < 0.5.
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That is, agent 1 is fuzzy semidecisive over 3.
Using the same argument, agent 1 is fuzzy semidecisive over herself.
Then by definition L = {1} is fuzzy semidecisive.
Now we show that the intersection of two fuzzy semidecisive coalitions
is fuzzy semidecisive. First we prove that L ∩ L
′
6= ∅. Suppose that
this is not the case.
Without loss of generality, let L = {1} y L
′
= {2, 3}.
Consider the profile
P = ({0.7, 0.1, 0.1}, {0.4, 0.7, 0.1}, {0.1, 0.9, 0.3}).
Then fPJ (1), f
P
J (2) ≥ 0.5.
But by FI and FC we have |fP
′
J |
> = 3 with
P
′
= ({0.7, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.3, 0.8, 0.9}, {0.1, 0.7, 0.8}),
a contradiction.
Then L ∩ L
′
6= ∅.
Second we prove that L ∩ L
′
is fuzzy semidecisive. Without loss of
generality, let L = {1, 3} and L
′
= {1, 2}.
Consider another profile
P = ({0.7, 0.1, 0.1}, {0.4, 0.1, 0.8}, {0.1, 0.9, 0.3})
and suppose that, fPJ (1) < 0.5.
If fPJ (2) ≥ 0.5, then by FI, FC and the fact that L
′
is fuzzy semidecisive,
we have that |fP
′
J |
> = 3 with
P
′
= ({0.7, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.8, 0.1, 0.9}, {0.1, 0.7, 0.8}),
a contradiction.
Alternatively, if fPJ (3) ≥ 0.5, then consider the following profile
P
′′
= ({0.7, 0.6, 0.1}, {0.8, 0.1, 0.8}, {0.1, 0.9, 0.3}).
By FI, fP
′′
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
Because L and L
′
are fuzzy semidecisive, fP
′′
J (1), f
P
′′
J (2) ≥ 0.5.
Then |fP
′′
J |
> = 3, a contradiction.
Thus, fPJ (1) ≥ 0.5, and FI imply that
for all P ∈ P, [p1(1) ≥ 0.5, p2(1) < 0.5, p3(1) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (1) ≥ 0.5.
(5)
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Now consider another profile
P = ({0.4, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.8, 0.4, 0.1}, {0.8, 0.2, 0.3}).
If fPJ (1) ≥ 0.5, then it follows from FI and the fact that L and L
′
are
fuzzy semidecisive, that |fP
′
J |
> = 3 if
P
′
= ({0.4, 0.6, 0.7}, {0.8, 0.6, 0.1}, {0.8, 0.2, 0.8}),
a contradiction.
Thus fPJ (1) < 0.5 and by FI
for all P ∈ P, [p1(1) < 0.5, p2(1) ≥ 0.5, p3(1) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (1) < 0.5.
(6)
Then we have that L = {1} is fuzzy semidecisive.
We prove that given a coalition L ⊆ N , either L is fuzzy semidecisive
or N \ L is fuzzy semidecisive.
By FC, N is fuzzy semidecisive over N . Without loss of general-
ity, fix L = {1, 2} and suppose by contradiction that L is not fuzzy
semidecisive. Then it must exist a profile P and an individual i ∈ N ,
such that p1(i) ≥ 0.5, p2(i) ≥ 0.5, p3(i) < 0.5 and f
P
J (i) < 0.5; or
p1(i) < 0.5, p2(i) < 0.5, p3(i) ≥ 0.5 and f
P
J (i) ≥ 0.5.
Suppose the latter is the case, and let i = 1. By FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(1) < 0.5, p2(1) < 0.5, p3(1) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (1) ≥ 0.5.
(7)
We want to prove that N \ L = {3} is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 1.
To do this, we have to show that the following is the case:
for all P ∈ P, [p1(1) ≥ 0.5, p2(1) ≥ 0.5, p3(1) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (1) < 0.5.
(8)
Consider the profile
P 1 = ({0.6, 0.1, 0.1}, {0.8, 0.4, 0.1}, {0.4, 0.6, 0.3}).
If fP
1
J (1) ≥ 0.5, the wanted result follows from FI. If not, i.e. if f
P 1
J (1) <
0.5 we proceed as follows. First, we note that by FC, fP
1
J (3) < 0.5.
Second, if fP
1
J (2) ≥ 0.5, then we have that |f
P 2
J |
> = 3 if
P 2 = ({0.6, 0.3, 0.7}, {0.8, 0.1, 0.9}, {0.2, 0.6, 0.8}).
Then it must be that case that fP
1
J (1) ≥ 0.5, and by FI,
for all P ∈ P, [p1(1) ≥ 0.5, p2(1) ≥ 0.5, p3(1) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (1) ≥ 0.5.
(9)
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Consider profile
P 3 = ({0.4, 0.1, 0.7}, {0.3, 0.4, 0.9}, {0.4, 0.6, 0.3}).
By FC fP
3
J (1) < 0.5.
If fP
3
J (2) ≥ 0.5, then by FC and FI we have that |f
P 4
J |
> = 3 if
P 4 = ({0.6, 0.3, 0.7}, {0.8, 0.1, 0.9}, {0.2, 0.6, 0.8}).
Thus, it must be fP
3
J (3) ≥ 0.5; and by FI
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) ≥ 0.5, p2(3) ≥ 0.5, p3(3) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
(10)
But then, by FI, (7) y (10), we have that |fP
5
J |
> = 3 if
P 5 = ({0.1, 0.6, 0.7}, {0.3, 0.6, 0.9}, {0.8, 0.6, 0.1}),
a contradiction.
Then we have that N \ L = {3} is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 1. Fi-
nally we obtain that L = {3} is fuzzy semidecisive for N .
Now we prove that if a coalition L is fuzzy semidecisive, with |L| > 1,
the subsets and suprasets of L are also fuzzy semidecisive.
Let L ⊆ L
′
⊆ N , with L fuzzy semidecisive. If L
′
is not fuzzy semide-
cisive, then N \ L
′
is fuzzy semidecisive.
But then L ⊆ L
′
, (N \ L
′
) ∩ L = ∅, contradicting our previous proof.
Thus L
′
must be fuzzy semidecisive over N .
Now consider h ∈ L. If L \ {h} is fuzzy semidecisive, the result is
proved. If not, we have that N \ (L \ {h}) is fuzzy semidecisive.
Then we have that N \ (L \ {h}) ∩ L = {h}.
The next step is to prove that there always exists an agent h ∈ N such
that {h} is fuzzy semidecisive.
By FC, N is fuzzy semidecisive, thus there exists L
′
⊆ N such that
N \ L
′
is fuzzy semidecisive. Then there must exist L
′′
such that
(N \ L
′
) \ L
′′
is fuzzy semidecisive.
Because N is finite, by iterating this process we find an h ∈ N that is
fuzzy semidecisive over N .
Finally we prove that if a coalition L ⊆ N is fuzzy semidecisive, then
it is fuzzy decisive. For that, consider a fuzzy semidecisive coalition
L ⊆ N .
Then there exists h ∈ L that is fuzzy semidecisive over N . Without
loss of generality, suppose that h = 1. Suppose that {1} is not fuzzy
decisive for agent 2.
Then it must exist a profile P such that
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(a) p1(2) ≥ 0.5 and f
P
J (2) < 0.5 or
(b) p1(2) < 0.5 and f
P
J (2) ≥ 0.5.
Suppose that (a) is the case (the other case is analogous). Since by
hypothesis {1} is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 2, there has to exist a
j 6= 1 such that pj(2) > 0.5.
Moreover, there must exist an agent k ∈ N \ {1, j} such that pk(2) <
0.5. Otherwise, by FC we get fPJ (2) ≥ 0.5. Without loss of generality,
consider the case where
P = ({0.1, 0.8, 0.2}, {0.1, 0.1, 0.9}, {0.2, 0.6, 0.1}).
By FC, fPJ (1) < 0.5. Then f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
By FI
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) < 0.5, p2(3) ≥ 0.5, p3(3) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
(11)
Consider the following profile
P
′
= ({0.1, 0.3, 0.8}, {0.9, 0.1, 0.2}, {0.2, 0.6, 0.9}).
If fP
′
J (3) < 0.5, then by FI
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) ≥ 0.5, p2(3) < 0.5, p3(3) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) < 0.5.
(12)
Because {2} is fuzzy semidecisive over 3, by (11) and (12), we get that
it is fuzzy semidecisive over N .
But, {1} ∩ {2} = ∅, a contradiction.
Then fP
′
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
Moreover, by FI
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) ≥ 0.5, p2(3) < 0.5, p3(3) ≥ 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
Because {1} is fuzzy semidecisive over 3, we also know that
for all P ∈ P, [p1(3) ≥ 0.5, p2(3) < 0.5, p3(3) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5.
Then if for all P ∈ P,
[p1(3) ≥ 0.5, p2(3) < 0.5, p3(3) < 0.5]⇒ f
P
J (3) ≥ 0.5,
we would get the desired result and {1} would be fuzzy decisive for
agent 3.
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Otherwise, we can repeat the previous argument and show that {3} is
fuzzy semidecisive over N , which would lead us to a contradiction since
{1} ∩ {3} = ∅.
Because 1 ∈ L, we have that L is fuzzy semidecisive for agent 3.
Finally, a similar argument shows that L is fuzzy decisive for all i ∈ N .
So we have that whenever a FCIF verifies FC and FI, there must exist
an agent fuzzy decisive over N .
The impossibility of a FCIF is proved by set inclusion, since the Dic-
tatorial FCIF does not verify the hypothesis in P∗∗∗ → F∗∗.
3. The proof is similar to (2).
We see in the following example that the aggregator proposed in part 1
of Theorem 3 is not the Dictatorial FCIF.
Example 5. If we consider the following profile P = ({0.2, 0.3, 0.9}, {0.9, 0.9, 1}, {1, 0, 0.3}),
we obtain fPJ (1) = 0.75, f
P
J (2) = 0.35 and f
P
J (3) = 0.75, which is different
to the opinion of any agent.
When we use the crisp version of the Independence axiom, we find a sim-
ilar result using an analogous proof.
Theorem 4. Consider FCIFs that verify the axioms FC and I.
1. Dictatorial is not the only FCIF such that FJ : P∗∗∗ → F∗∗∗.
2. Dictatorial is the only FCIF such that FJ : P∗ → F∗∗ or FJ : P∗∗ → F∗∗,
and there is no FCIF such that FJ : P∗∗∗ → F∗∗.
3. Dictatorial is the only FCIF such that FJ : P∗ → F∗, and there is no
FCIF such that FJ : P∗∗ → F∗ or FJ : P∗∗∗ → F∗.
Proof. We only prove (1) since the proofs of (2) and (3) are similar to the
proofs of (2) and (3) of Theorem (3).
1. We call a FCIF Democratic if
fJ(i) =
p1(i) + . . .+ pn(i)
n
for all i ∈ N .
This FCIF verifies FC and I.
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The fuzzy structure provides the opportunity to find non dictatorial rules.
If a FCIF verifies I, fJ(i) will only depend on the opinions pj(i).
A function f : Rk → R that verifies min{a1, . . . , ak} ≤ f(a1, . . . , ak) ≤
max{a1, . . . , ak} is called a k-dimensional mean (Hajja, 2013). A FCIF that
verifies FC is then, a n-dimensional mean.
The mean can yield different levels of “democracy”, in the sense that the
Dictatorial FCIF is a mean while the Democratic FCIF is also a mean.
A natural question is whether every n-dimensional mean yields a fuzzy ag-
gregation function.
The following example shows that the answer is negative.
Example 6. The Inclusive and Unanimous FCIFs are n-dimensional means.
Consider the Unanimous FCIF and the profile
P = {(0, 0.2, 0.3), (1, 0, 0.5), (0.3, 0.8, 0)}.
We obtain U(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , a membership function that does not
belong to F ∗∗∗.
5 Conclusion
In this work we analyze, from a fuzzy point of view, the Group Identification
Problem. The opinions of the agents are no longer crisp statements about the
membership or not to a group. Instead of that, their opinions are expressed
in terms of degrees of membership to the class of Js.
We presented the axioms that have been already analyzed in the literature
and gave fuzzy versions of them. In the case of ‘Liberal’ aggregators, the
uniqueness and impossibility results from K-R still remain.
The axioms FL and FEL (L and EL) are very restrictive, and do not allow
more rules other than the Strong Liberal FCIF.
When we deal with the ‘Dictatorial’ aggregator, the results are richer than
in the crisp version, due to the different interpretations that we may give to
the domain and range conditions postulated in K-R.
Depending on the goals of the social planner we can have several, just one
or no rules satisfying the desired properties.
The binary nature of determining if someone has more or less than 0.5 degree
of acceptance, leads in general to the preservation of the uniqueness and
impossibility results.
However, when we modify the domain and range of the FCIFs, we get the
possibility of choosing more rules than just the Dictatorial one.
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